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INTRODUCTION 
What life lies beyond the death of a human person 
according to the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead? 
How does objective immortality, the "stubborn fact" in 
the universe, the resulting satisfaction of an actual 
occasion, relate to the possibility of personal immor-
tality? If personal immortality is possible, what are 
its characteristics? 
In Whitehead's metaphysics, a viable possibility of 
personal immortality exists within the context of two 
notions: the valuation enacted by an actual occasion, 
and the way valuation of a temporal occasion has ongo-
ing importance for God in God's nontemporality. Can 
what perishes in the concrescence, the subjective imme-
diacy of the occasion, be saved from total elimination 
from the process universe? If so, a synthesis whereby 
both the subjective immediacy and the objective immor-
tality of an occasion persists in God's prehension of 
the temporal world is possible in the intersection of 
God's non-temporality and the temporality of the world. 
IMMORTALITY AND THE HUMAN PERSON 
Before making the attempt to discover the possibil-
ity of immortality, one must ask: "Need immortality be 
possible; must occasions perish?11 Entities "perish" 
(exhaust their subjective immediacy) and "become" (at-
tain satisfaction and objective immortality) so that 
superseding entities can "use" the objectification of 
the previous entity for its own concrescence. Anything 
short of objectification (though it is hard to say what 
something might be "short of" objectification) cannot 
be appropriated by later occasions. "Until (an actual 
occasion] attains a determinate outcome, therefore, it 
cannot be objectified by other entities as an actual 
thing."1 "Becoming" in the universe needs things which 
have already "become." 
Entities becoming and perishing does not mitigate 
the possibility of immortality of the human person for 
Whitehead. Passages from Process and Reality leave the 
possibility an open question. 
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(A]11 actual things are alike objects . . . [but 
also) all actual things are subjects, each pre-
hending the universe from which it arises . . . . 
Self-identity requires that every entity have one 
conjoined, self-consistent function, whatever be 
the complexity of that function.2 
Whitehead emphasizes the importance of refraining from 
a traditional subject/object distinction in reality. 
Does this also affect objective immortality? He in-
tends objective immortality to stand in a categorical 
way. Yet even though the main thrust of Whitehead's 
metaphysics shows how subjective perishing makes objec-
tive immortality possible, something else about it sug-
gests the possibility of another kind of immortality. 
The suggestion lies in Whitehead's discussion of 
two kinds of fluency in the world. His metaphysics 
views "concrescence" as "the fluency inherent in the 
constitution of the particular existent," and "transi-
tion" as 
the fluency . . . on the completion of the par-
ticular existent [which] constitutes that ex-
istent as an original element in the constitu-
tions of other particular existents elicited by 
repetitions of process. . . . Concresence moves 
towards its final cause, which is its subjective 
aim; transition is the vehicle of the efficient 
cause, which is the immortal past.' 
For Whitehead, time considerations primarily make 
genetic sense. The order of past, present and future, 
the familiar linear tradition of time, is inadequate. 
Instead, whatever is past is objective in kind, and 
whatever is present is subjective in kind. This per-
spective (and the previous quotation) makes it diffi-
cult to say how Whitehead considered an immortal pre-
sent. 
Whitehead's metaphysical assertions seem less 
forceful and more removed when moving from the mi-
croscopic level of occasions and their prehensions to 
macroscopic considerations of nexus and societies. 
They are not any less forceful, but it is a long road 
from occasions to anything like a human person. How is 
unification possible (nexus is inseparable from group 
of occasions), and what is the degree of this unifica-
tion? Whitehead writes that a multiple nexus is "how 
those actual entities are really together . . . by rea-
son of the objective immortality of their real mutual 
prehension of each other."1* 
The objective immortality gained by an actual en-
tity in its satisfaction is not opposed to or contra-
dictory of the possibility of personal immortality. It 
is not a contrast of objective immortality, but a syn-
thesis of objective immortality and subjective immedia-
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cy. Objective immortality is a way the concreteness of 
the valuation of an entity is established. Therefore, 
the investigation into the possibility of personal im-
mortality ought not guard against "objectification," 
but against abstractions occuring in hypothetical divi-
sions of concrescence and against the eliminations and 
losses resulting from abstractions.* 
How are both past and present entities grouped into 
a single unity? What notion of "future" is involved? 
Do particular occasions "give up" their subjective im-
mediacy so new subjective immediacies of actual occa-
sions can arise? Or do they "use up" their subjective 
immediacy in their own concrescence? 
Whitehead makes these problems more explicable in 
Modes of Thought. The usual mind-body problem is 
avoided through Whitehead's understanding of nexus and 
societies. Also, the problem of how both past and pre-
sent intermix with each other is intuitively plausible 
in Whitehead's explanation of the human person as a 
single substance. 
(O)ur bodies lie beyond our own individual exist-
ence. And yet they are a part of it. We think 
of ourselves as intimately entwined in bodily 
life that a man is a complex unity--body and 
mind. But the body is part of the external 
world, and continuous with it. 8 
What is "already finished" is our body, the immedi-
ately antecedent states of the body. We depend upon 
these states being finished in order to live. But to 
conceive of the body purely in instrumental terms is 
contrary to Whitehead. It is continuous with the ex-
ternal world, where unities of any degree of complexity 
are found. To separate the mind and body into cate-
gories is wrongheaded, expecially in Whitehead's 
scheme, for there is no way to tell where one ends and 
the other begins. "|0)ur feeling of bodily-unity is a 
primary experience. . . . No one ever says, Here am 
I, and I have brought my body with me." 7 
For Whitehead, the human person is constituted by a 
multiplicity of occasions characterized by the parallel 
idea of the subjective aim of an occasion. The mul-
tiplicity of these occasions have running through them 
a strand of self-identity which Whitehead calls "per-
sonal unity." The personal unity of the complex 
society called human person parallels at the mac-
roscopic level the function entailed by the subjective 
aim of an occasion at the microscopic level. He cites 
Plato's doctrine of the Receptacle in the Timaeus to 
support the concept of personal unity "whose sole func-
tion is the imposition of a unity upon the events of 
nature." This thread is important in that "|those 
events) obtain their actuality by reason of emplacement 
within |a single locus) community."• 
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The subjective aim of an occasion begins with its 
"initial aim." John Cobb, in A Christian Natural 
Theology, understands Whitehead's use of the initial 
aim as having at least three sources of meaning. The 
first is aim as defined by the eternal objects; the 
second is aim as "a focus upon the satisfaction aimed 
at;" and third is the act of "aiming at," the immediate 
feeling of an occasion of its subjective aim.* Cobb's 
chosen purpose emphasizes the third source of meaning, 
"upon the act of aiming itself." This is the emphasis 
or aim important for the possibility of personal immor-
tality. 
ISSUES ABOUT TIME AND GOD'S CONSEQUENT NATURE 
Time-as-present and time-as-past are well-grounded 
in Whitehead's considerations of nexus and societies. 
What is his conception of time beyond the present, 
time-as-future? This dimension is "not so evident in 
terms of the doctrine of the subject-object structure 
of experience." Instead, time-as-future finds a place 
in the present in a formally parallel way as time-as-
past finds its place. "immediate existence requires 
the insertion of the future in the crannies of the pre-
sent."" 
Immortality must be for all times, past, present 
and future. If any "vehicle" is going to lend itself 
to the possibility of subjective immortality of actual 
occasions, it must be within God's consequent nature. 
In The Lure of God, Lewis S. Ford writes "there has 
been a tendency to consider each nature [in God's pri-
mordial and consequent natures) as having its own 
distinctive functions, each operating with some degree 
of independence from the other." 1 1 But Ford insists 
this tendency is inaccurate and inappropriate. These 
two natures are inextricably intertwined, with the pri-
mordial nature, as the source of possible ideals, serv-
ing as initial aims for occasions, and the consequent 
nature experiencing the actual world which "forms the 
basis whereby God can specify which aims are relevant 
for which occasions."1' 
Cobb gives an even greater emphasis upon the way 
God's consequent nature experiences the actual world. 
That experience is not merely the "taking account" of 
an occasion's "public behavior;" instead, what God 
takes up "is our experience in the full intimacy of 
[that experience's] subjective immediacy."11 Cobb's 
comment indicates how subjective immediacy is experi-
enced by God even as the occasion is in its process of 
concrescence. The important point is not to avoid ob-
jectif ication qua objectification but to avoid objec-
tif ication qua an "incomplete" or "less than fully re-
alized" objectification.lk 
The question of whether something like "survival" 
is possible for subjective immediacy is caught between 
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the temporal category of the future and the way God's 
experience of the temporal world derives from God's 
nontemporality. So beginning prior to the perishing of 
the occasion, 
God's presence is internal to himself, derived 
from his nontemporality, but out of that and the 
past which he recieves from the world he creates 
a new future, as he transforms his pure possibil-
ities into real possibilities, that is, realiza-
ble possibilities under the conditions of the 
world. . . . [God] is a nontemporal actuality 
who influences us by the future he now creates; 
by means of the real possibilities he persuades 
the world to actualize.1* 
The creativity in God differs from the creativity 
in other actual entities (while maintaining there is 
only "creativity"). In the consequent nature, God per-
forms the role of working with metaphysical rules and 
constructs in "creating" some particular cosmos. This 
is the transformation from pure possibilities (metaphy-
sics) to real possibilities (cosmology). Other actual 
entities "create" within the cosmos God has delivered; 
they narrow the cosmos a bit more. Hence a second 
transformation from real possibilities (cosmology) to 
real actualities (ontology). 
Why do considerations of creativity become crucial 
for the possibility of subjective immortality? To be 
present, to be a subject, is to experience, and "each 
moment of experience confesses itself to be a transi-
tion between two worlds, the immediate past and the im-
mediate future."1' Reflection upon the future leads to 
the desire to understand what might be the "form" 
(naive Aristotelean sense) of the future immanent in 
the present. Whitehead has already stated that the 
"form" of the past gains an immanent foothold in the 
present by way of the objective immortality of actual 
occasions whose subjective immediacy have "perished" 
and have achieved a metaphysical status of "stubborn 
fact" for subsequent concrescing occasions. But "the 
future must be present in some different sense to the 
objective immortality of the individual occasions of 
the past." 1 7 The way the doctrine of the future ought 
to be understood is "in terms of the account of the 
process of self-completion of each individual actual 
occasion."*' 
The actual occasion's role in this process universe 
is to be, to complete itself. But how does God 
"complete" himself? An occasion issues in satisfac-
tion; but what is the sense of satisfaction for God? 
Ford and Marjorie Suchocki suggest that "if for the oc-
casion concrescence issues in satisfaction, then for 
God satisfaction must issue in concrescence." They 
begin from this premise: "God's nontemporal satisfac-
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tion, insofar as it is relevant, precedes the everlast-
ing concrescence it issues into."1' Occasions reaching 
objectivity exhibit satisfaction; God, in satisfaction, 
exhibits objectivity (a clumsy way of saying "being"). 
The relation of concrescence and satisfaction in 
God is a peculiar issue for Whiteheadean metaphysics.1' 
The subjective immediacy of personal immortality finds 
itself in the intersection of the temporality of occa-
sions and God's nontemporality, "the everlasting." 
This raises the question of whose immediacy is now in-
volved in the prehension of the temporal world: is it 
God's subjectivity "at work," or is it the subjectivity 
of the concresced occasion? Ford and Suchocki respond 
to this by saying the experience "is God's materially, 
. . . mine having perished. But it is mine formally, 
for I am the author of that particular way of ex-
periencing that situation."11 
GOD REENACTS THE SUBJECTIVE AIM OF 
A "PERISHED" OCCASION 
A section from Process and Reality lends support to 
the idea of subjective immortality. 
There are . . . four creative phases in which the 
universe accomplishes its actuality. . . . [The 
third) is the phase of perfected actuality, in 
which the many are one everlastingly, without a 
qualification of any loss either of individual 
identity or of completeness of unity. In ever-
lastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objec-
tive immortality. This phase derives the condi-
tions of its being from the two antecedent phases 
(namely, from the nontemporal conceptual origina-
tion phase and the temporal physical origination 
phase). 1 1 
How the past and the present are said to be one reaches 
a resolution in this creative third phase. The phase 
employs "everlastingness," a temporal concept providing 
contextual reference for the categories of temporality 
and nontemporality. Actual occasions are temporal, but 
it is imprecise to speak of God as simply nontemporal. 
To limit God in this way damages God's immanence in the 
World. Whitehead more appropriately speaks of "the 
everlasting nature of God, which in a sense is nontem-
poral and in another sense is temporal"; this nature of 
God "may establish with the soul a peculiarly intense 
relationship of mutual immanence.na* 
This third phase, where immediacy is reconciled 
with objective immortality, supports a synthesis of 
these two ideas and not the displacement of one by the 
other. The perishing of actual occasions in the tem-
poral world makes for their objective immortality in 
God; but for the aim of the occasion to be intense and 
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complete enough to fit God's experiencing of the World, 
the requisite immediacy must be appropriate to the in-
tensity and completeness. So the immediacy must be at-
tributable both to God and to the occasion. Objective 
immortality does not make subjective immediacy logi-
cally impossible, but is a necessary correlate of per-
sonal immortality. 
This creative phase in no way eliminates the dif-
ference between God and other actual entities. The 
creativity at work in both God and the other entities 
is the same creativity, but in different manifesta-
tions. The creativity of finite occasions is relative 
to finite occasions, allowing it to transcend its past 
but not its future. But the creativity at work in God 
is absolute, transcending every actuality by taking 
those actualities and incorporating them into God's 
being." 
If everlastingness provides a context whereby tem-
poral occasions move from temporality, yet preserve 
their own "presence," then the occasion's subjective 
immediacy persists (is not eliminated) "in spite of" 
the occasion's objective immortality. It is mislead-
ing, however, to identify the persisting immediacy as 
the subjective immediacy of the occassion, for that im-
mediacy has its "being" in the "becoming" of the occa-
sion. Once an occasion is. Whitehead insists, subjec-
tive immediacy ceases to be. Still, the sufficient in-
tensity of feeling in God's prehension of the World is 
needed, so something like immediacy must be at work. 
Whose immediacy it is has not been determined, but it 
need not be God's immediacy (cf. Ford and Suchocki, n. 
21 above). 
Cobb thinks a problem exists if this is to be "lo-
cated" in God's consequent nature, possibly conflicting 
with the principle "contemporaries do not prehend each 
other." This can be avoided, Cobb thinks, by consider-
ing that "God also prehends temporal occasions in their 
contemporaneity, and therefore shares the immediacy of 
every becoming occasion."1* 
Ford and Suchocki conceive of the being of an im-
mortal subjective immediacy as one of contemplation. 
[I)n God we no longer act but contemplate. . . . 
Occasions in their coming-to-be struggled with 
incompatibilities, but as reenacted in being they 
no longer find that competitiveness need be the 
case. . . . There is no more competitive vying 
for one value at the expense of another, for now 
all chosen values are now quite actual.2' 
As temporalities, occasions in God exhaust their fu-
tures and begin to "knit together" in God. The first 
part of the "knitting" occurs at the level of the par-
ticular personal life to which those occasions be-
longed, and the second part erases the distinction of 
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particular personalities such that they merge along the 
lines of characteristics like personal affinity and af-
fection. 2 7 
HOW SUBJECTIVE IMMEDIACY PERSISTS: VALUATION 
Creativity is the energy of a process universe. 
Finite actualities of experience exhaust their creativ-
ity in a single momentary act, an act of self-unifi-
cation superseded by other acts.2* God draws all these 
entities into an inexhaustible unity, "since the inner 
aim informing divine creativity and impelling it for-
ward is infinite, seeking the realization of every pos-
sibility, each in its own season."2' 
Whitehead discusses whether the "complete self-
identity" of occasions must mitigate the possibility of 
subjective immediacy or exhaust an occasion's subjec-
tive aim as it is reenacted in God. Completeness 
depends on whether an occasion in its becoming persists 
in the same way as beyond its becoming. "(C)omplete 
self-identity can never be preserved in any advance to 
novelty." There is some sense in saying I am the same 
person I was when I was five years old, and yet there 
is at least as much sense (if not more) in saying that 
who I was at five years old vastly differs from who I 
am today. What this does, says Whitehead, neither 
proves nor disproves the possibility of personal im-
mortality. 
In his article "The Disembodied Soul," John Bennett 
considers whether anything like personal immortality is 
possible outside of a subjectivity's physical environ-
ment, namely, its body. He is against this possibil-
ity, for the environment of an occasion affects the 
complexity of the occasion, in turn affecting personal 
identity. "Thus apart from the body, the soul would 
. . . not have the variety of content and degree of 
novelty that properly characterize a living person." 2 1 
Bennett rightly notices the environment as impor-
tant to the subjective immediacy of a concrescing occa-
sion, but wrongly estimates the immediacy's capacity to 
function only within a "body" environment. Whitehead 
and Ford argue for another element, though not strictly 
an "environment" of nexus or societies, but still in-
tense enough to account for the complexity of personal 
identity. They refer to this element as valuation. 
If his metaphysics is simply a matter of dogmatic 
application of principles to phenomena, Whitehead rec-
ognizes, it becomes difficult to explain something like 
the persistence of personal identity even in the day-
to-day living of ordinary people. Instead, "the sur-
vival of personal identity within the immediacy of a 
present occasion . . . is a partial negation of its 
transitory character." What does Whitehead point to in 
this survival? "It is the introduction of stability by 
the influence of value." 1 2 
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Moreover, "the effective realization of value in 
the world of change should find its counterpart in the 
world of value. This means temporal personality in one 
world involves immortal personality in the other. 1 1 , 1 
These are considerations Ford and Suchocki bring up 
about the possibility of God's ongoing satisfaction (n. 
19 above). Temporal occasions in their concrescence 
realize value in the changing, temporal world. But 
what about the "world of value," the unchanging world, 
the nontemporal world of God? 
If one expands upon Whitehead's quotation, perhaps 
something like "the effective realization of change" 
meets God's ongoing satisfaction. It is an ongoing 
satisfaction, for nothing finishes or exhausts God. 
But the value attained by the occasion "completing" God 
is a real sense of satisfaction, especially as consid-
ered from the viewpoint of God's consequent nature. 
But the only way a particular value of an occasion 
completes God is if with the value goes an intensity 
that is nothing less than the subjective immediacy the 
occasion enjoys prior to its objective immortality. 
What is crucial is completeness and concreteness, as 
opposed to abstractions and the losses resulting from 
those abstractions.1* The value of a chair is valued 
as a chair because the occasions that gave themselves 
over to objectivity gave themselves over as a chair and 
not as a piece of wood or of metal. Perhaps it also 
holds that the value each of us gives ourself over to 
is valued by God for its particular value. 
Ford gives some hints for reconciling valuation 
with the earlier problem raised by Bennett concerning a 
disembodied soul. The biblical exegesis of The Lure of 
God considers how St. Paul understood the term ~~Trphys-
ical body." 
"|P]hysical body," (RSV), is not soma phusikon 
but soma psuchikon, a "psychical bodyT" - The or-
dinary human body is not composed of some psychi-
cal material, but a psychical body animated by a 
soul or mind or psyche which organizes and di-
rects its activity.15 
What Cartesians commonly understand as consciousness 
inhabiting a corporeal body is not Paul's meaning. The 
mind itself is "inhabited," directed and organized by 
"something else." 
In order to meet the possibility of subjective im-
mortality in Whitehead's metaphysics, it appears this 
"something else" must be the synthesis of both the sub-
jective immediacy and the objective immortality of an 
actual occasion. Given Ford's observation, the perish-
ing of the corporeal body of a person becomes immateri-
al. The proper environment of presently existent per-
sonal identity is not so much the corporeal as it is 
the psychical; however the environment is indetermi-
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nate, for the subjective immediacy beyond the death of 
the corporeal body is not a parallel of the corpus but 
of the psyche. Although Bennett asks the right ques-
tion concerning the importance of environment, the en-
vironment itself varies and makes a difference to the 
question of disembodied immortality. 
But Ford too is ready to discount disembodied sur-
vival as questionable at best, for "the soul might 
still be able to exist, but in such an impoverished 
state that it hardly seems worthwhile." He allows for 
the possibility of immortality by suggesting that the 
survival of subjective immediacy can come about "if the 
ongoing life of God were to provide the support for 
these continuing occasions of the soul which it had 
been accustomed to receive from the body." 1 8 
A final consideration of this life after death is 
the extent to which an individual's personality per-
sists beyond death (nn. 22 and 27 above). If the 
reconciliation of subjective immediacy with objective 
immortality is impossible, then Ford completely dismis-
ses all possibility of subjective immortality.17 The 
self loses itself in being merged with God rather than 
contributing a restriction to the process universe. 
"Perhaps in this transfer of concern from our own life 
to God's we may discover this final peace."*8 
TIME, VALUATION AND IMMORTALITY 
Any possibility of the immortality of the human 
person in Whitehead's metaphysics cannot be conceived 
as the same kind of "immortality of the soul" of Plato 
or of Christianity. This is so on two counts. First, 
Bennett's objection concerning the importance of the 
body-environment (n. 31) addresses this claim. Second, 
it is supported by Ford's observation that what we are 
might not be a soul inhabiting a body, but a 
"something" organizing both the soul and the body for 
itself (n. 35), namely, the synthesis of the subjective 
immediacy and the objective immortality of an occasion 
as its subjective aim is reenacted in God. Whitehead 
treats "soul" as a misconception of the human person; 
his metaphysics does not argue for the immortality of 
misconceptions. Yet a person's immortality is possible 
in Whitehead's scheme. 
The next consideration is whether valuation is more 
like "subjectification" or more like "objectification." 
Ford and Suchocki suggest (n. 21 above) that valuation 
is something to be met exclusively (at least from the 
point of view of the contributing occasion) by the 
occasion's subjective immediacy as it contributes to 
God's reenactment of its subjective aim. On the other 
hand, Whitehead's metaphysics lends support to valua-
tion as a synthesis of immediacy (subjectification 
aspect) and immortality (objectification aspect).** 
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The suggestion of God's reenacttnent of a subjective 
aim is, at least conceptually speaking, somewhat better 
accomodated as an "object" reenacted, rather than as a 
"subject." But whether God's reenactment is objective 
in the universe, not by way of God's natures but by way 
of God's timelessness, is uncertain. Does anything 
like "subject" or ffobject" (which Whitehead uses in a 
descriptive manner) still adequately describe God's re-
enactment in eternality? Disjunctively proposed ques-
tions of valuation ought to be rigorously avoided. 
Valuation must be reconsidered not as an either/or 
proposition of subject versus object, but as a synthe-
sis of both subject and object, of both immediacy and 
immortality. Any attempts to present personal immor-
tality in Whitehead's scheme of things must thoroughly 
consider the ideas of time and value. Coherently ar-
gued considerations would make it plausible for immor-
tality to be as real and actual a situation as are oc-
casions, nexus, societies, God, eternal objects, pre-
hensions, and other Whiteheadean "creatures." 
In a comprehensive way, Whitehead has already dealt 
with the way objective immortality "feeds" subjective 
immediacy. But to suggest that subjective immortality 
feeds anything like objective immediacy is off the 
mark. "Objective immediacy" is not a paradox, but a 
contradiction, for the time of objectivity (the past) 
cannot be reconciled with the time of immediacy (the 
present). But subjective immortality makes more sense 
if conceived as feeding God's consequent nature, and 
subjective immortality need not be a contradiction. It 
is a paradox, for the time of subjectivity (the pre-
sent) submits to "immortal" time, that which is "then," 
"now" and "to be" always. 
For Whitehead, concepts of persistence over time 
give rise to a world of value. "Value is in its nature 
timeless and immortal. Its essence is not rooted in 
any passing circumstance." The immediacy of a given 
occasion is momentary as it is viewed for the world of 
fact, for objectivity. But in valuation, in its being 
valuable, it becomes an eternal moment. "The immediacy 
of some mortal circumstance is only valuable because it 
shares in the immortality of some value."1'0 
Also recall Ford's remark of the damage done in 
considering Whitehead as too categorical regarding 
God's primordial and consequent natures (n. 11 above). 
Subjective immortality stands as the area of transmuta-
tion for subjective immediacies to satisfy God. They 
do not exhaust but fulfill God in the sense of making 
another happy. 
Perhaps this differs from the usual considerations 
of being happy. Happiness is not and cannot be the 
end-all of God, for God is "constantly" happy. But we 
are caught between being "constantly" happy and being 
happy once and for all. In valuation, the task of 
choosing from so many various values, and of regarding 
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chosen values in so many various degrees, exhausts and 
finishes us. But God reenacts those values in the uni-
verse; and in order to properly meet God's own ongoing 
satisfaction, the reenactment is not God re-performing 
our subjective aim, but US performing OUR subjective 
aim, no longer in act, but in contemplation. 
A biblical foundation for the possibility of immor-
tality in Whitehead's metaphysics may not depend as 
much upon Paul's writings as it may depend upon someth-
ing worth considering from the Book of Wisdom: "For 
God formed man to be imperishable; the image of his 
own nature. . . . They seemed, in the view of the 
foolish, to be dead . . . yet is their hope full of 
immortality" (Wisdom 2:23, 3:3,4). In Whitehead's 
scheme, as objective immortality constitutes the "stub-
born fact" of the universe, so subjective immortality, 
the synthesis of subjective immediacy and objective im-
mortality, constitutes the "stubborn value" of the same 
universe. 
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